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Alson: Someone Talked! The Necessity of Prohibitions Against Publishing

Note
SOMEONE TALKED!1 THE NECESSITY OF
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PUBLISHING
CLASSIFIED FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
For a moment, imagine a nightmare scenario for this nation.2 The
terrorist organization al Qaeda, never quenching in its appetite for the
destruction of America by ruthlessly murdering her civilians, acquires a
nuclear weapon after purchasing it from a rogue nation such as Iran or
North Korea. The purchase involves millions of dollars, accumulated
from various donations, “charities,” and other gifts from entities that
support al Qaeda’s objectives. The funds, normally held in European
bank accounts subject to tracking, are instead clandestinely held and
physically carried by persons and entities throughout the United States,
Europe, and the Middle East, eventually getting to terrorist leaders in
Pakistan. The funds are given to the rogue nation in exchange for the
nuclear suitcase bomb.
The nuclear weapon is transported via numerous al Qaeda
operatives onto a ship in the French port of Marseilles. The ship,
normally carrying only legitimate exports, sails to the port of Miami,
where the container carrying the weapon is smuggled. The container is
placed on a semi-truck and driven by a terrorist operative to
Washington, D.C. Upon arrival, a sleeper cell hides the bomb and awaits
a message from terrorist leaders overseas for the date of detonation.
Families of the sleeper cell, still living in the Middle East, each have been
given thousands of dollars; a few years ago, the money would have been
extracted from an al Qaeda bank account and digitally transferred to the
families’ bank accounts. Instead, the money is physically handed over.

1
A portion of the title of this Note is a reproduction of a famous World War II poster
slogan, depicting a drowning sailor. The National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/
research/ww2/photos/images/ww2-26.jpg (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) (for an illustration of
the poster).
2
This scenario is a hypothetical invented by the author.
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Throughout the multiple month process of planning and executing
the plot, thousands of communications have occurred. In the recent past,
many of the contacts with the sleeper cell in America would have been
sent though e-mails and telephone calls. However, in this case, the
communications occur by persons flying to and from Europe, where
operatives meet in safe houses. The few e-mails that are sent are
encrypted in elaborate code.
At a final meeting at a safe house in Europe, a member of the sleeper
cell is told of the date of the proposed attack in Washington, a
communication that may have previously occurred by a telephone
communication. A week later, the attack occurs, killing hundreds of
thousands of civilians and government employees, causing billions of
dollars of damage, and causing unfathomable grief to families and
strangers alike throughout America and around the world.
While the preceding scenario is frightening to imagine, such plots
may be in the planning stages by those persons who spend every waking
moment designing ways to destroy the United States. Each step of the
scheme involves secrecy and silence, a difficult task to accomplish,
especially if al Qaeda does not know America’s tactics of detecting the
terrorist organization’s operations. However, now imagine that the
terrorists have learned of two of the most top secret methods that
America currently uses to foil terrorist plots. They have gained this
knowledge neither through spies embedded in the State Department, nor
by blackmailing families of government leaders, but rather by simply
reading the front pages of major American newspapers. The reader need
not imagine this portion of the scenario, for it has already occurred.3
Currently, the Federal Criminal Code includes two provisions that
attempt to prohibit certain classified information from being published,
the Espionage Act and the COMINT statute.4 However, the language
and legislative history of the Espionage Act are difficult to fully
understand, and such ambiguity causes it to be ineffective as it relates to
disclosures through publishing.5 Additionally, the COMINT statute,
while explicitly outlawing the publication of certain communications
intelligence, is too narrow to encompass other classified intelligence
disclosures, the secrecy of which are crucial to national security
interests.6 Therefore, this Note proposes an additional provision to the
3
4
5
6
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See infra Parts II.A-B.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra note 37 for full text of the statute.
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Federal Criminal Code that would prohibit the publishing of classified
information which relates to the financial intelligence activities of the
United States.7
This Note explores the balance between freedom of the press and
necessary legislation to counter fears that some published information
may harm national security, and whether such laws should be enforced
and updated. Part II of this Note examines the history of current laws
such as the Espionage Age and the COMINT statute, the subsequent
enforcement of those laws, and the actions of the New York Times that
may have violated those statutes.8 Next, Part III inspects whether the
Espionage Act or COMINT statutes are sufficiently comprehensible to
encompass the articles published by the Times and whether public policy
considerations sanction such a prosecution.9 Furthermore, Part IV
proposes additional necessary legislation that would encompass
disclosures related to the financial activities of the United States against
which current laws do not protect.10
II. BACKGROUND
The balance between protecting confidential national security
information and the public’s right to know has undergone various
adjustments throughout this country’s history, especially as foreign
affairs transformed. Part II.A explores the evolution of the Espionage
Act’s creation, with particular emphasis not only on its legislative history
and the historic events that led to its enactment, but also the Act’s
ambiguity.11 Juxtaposing those provisions, Part II.B presents the
COMINT statute, including an analysis of its language and legislative
intent.12 Next, Part II.C examines the extent to which the Pentagon
Papers case affects current assessments of the prohibitions on the
publication of national security information.13 Then, Part II.D considers
subsequent judicial decisions that have reinforced the importance of
national security secrecy and trends towards its protection.14 Finally,
Part II.E reviews the New York Times’ recent disclosures of the
government’s program to monitor international communications

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
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without a court warrant, as well as its program of tracking terrorist
financial activity.15
A. The Espionage Act
To fully understand the meaning and potential application of 18
U.S.C. § 798, one must first grasp the way in which the fragile balance
between national security secrets and the freedoms of speech and press
have garnered attention in the legislative branch. For much of this
nation’s history, people who engaged in unauthorized disclosures of
government secrets were punished under general statutes regarding
treason, unlawful entry into military bases, and theft of government
property.16 Thereafter, Congress directly considered the issue of
protecting government secrets in the early twentieth century when it
passed the Defense Secrets Act of 1911 (“DSA”).17 The DSA, which was a
See infra Part II.E.
Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 (1973) (describing in much detail the federal
espionage statutes, focusing on how the Espionage Act’s language is difficult to fully
understand, and concluding that the basic espionage statutes are insufficiently drafted).
17
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 939-40 (quoting 36 Stat. 1804 (1911)). The statute
provides:
SEC. 1. That whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense, to which he is not lawfully entitled,
goes upon any vessel, or enters any navy-yard, naval station, fort,
battery, torpedo station, arsenal, camp, factory, building, office, or
other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed
or in process of construction by the United States, or in the possession
or under the control of the United States or any of its authorities or
agents, and whether situated within the United States or in any place
non-contiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof; or whoever,
when lawfully or unlawfully upon any vessel, or in or near any such
place, without proper authority, obtains, takes, or makes, or attempts
to obtain, take, or make, any document, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge of anything
connected with the national defense to which he is not entitled; or
whoever, without proper authority, receives or obtains, or undertakes
or agrees to receive or obtain, from any person, any such document,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or
knowledge, knowing the same to have been so obtained, taken or
made; or whoever, having possession of or control over any such
document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or
knowledge, willfully and without proper authority, communicates or
attempt to communicate the same to any person not entitled to receive
it, or to whom the same ought not, in the interest of the national
defense, be communicated at that time; or whoever, being lawfully
entrusted with any such document, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, plan, model, or knowledge, willfully and in breach of his
trust, so communicates or attempts to communicate the same, shall be
15
16
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precursor to various important sections of the current Espionage Act,
penalized the illegal stealing, gathering, and generic communicating of
information from in and around military installations.18 Moreover,
section two of the statute imposed a harsher penalty on the passing of
such information to a foreign government.19 In the extensive list of types
of actions punishable, “publishes” was not included.20
A few years later, just two days after the United States entered
World War I, Congress began debating the next major piece of legislation
dealing with the protection of national security information, the
Espionage Act of 1917.21 The DSA was included in the new Espionage
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
SEC. 2. That whoever, having committed any offense defined in
the preceding section, communicates or attempts to communicate to
any foreign government, or to any agent or employee thereof, any
document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or
knowledge so obtained, taken, or made, or so entrusted to him, shall
be imprisoned not more than ten years.
Id. A small amount of discussion occurred as to these provisions, as the House Judiciary
Committee report is five pages long. H.R. Rep. No. 1941, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1911). The
House of Representatives debate covered less than two pages of the Congressional Record.
46 CONG. REC. 2029-30 (1911). The Senate’s discussions of the provisions also lacked
extensive scrutiny. Id. at 3516.
18
36 Stat. 1804 (1911). Of the little discussion in the House regarding the statute, House
Judiciary Chairman Parker was asked about the meaning of the phrase “to which he is
[not] entitled.” 46 CONG. REC. 2030 (1911). Chairman Parker replied that the first draft of
the statute included the word “wrongfully,” but the Committee determined that not
entitled was less ambiguous than wrongfully. Id. However, the Chairman did not specify
as to how “not entitled” was any less vague than the previous language. Edgar & Schmidt,
supra note 16, at 1003. Such sloppy language throughout the statute was adopted by
subsequent legislation. Id. at 1005 (explaining that “the formless terms of the 1911 Act were
accorded a respect and a putative clarity in later legislative stages out of all keeping with
the casual process that spawned them”).
19
36 Stat. 1804 (1911).
20
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940.
21
40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version included in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006)). The
statutes, which have undergone little material alterations since their passage, have now
been codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(d) and § 794. In full §§ 793(a)–(d) state:
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is
to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains
information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy
yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery,
torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine,
telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office,
research laboratory or station or other place connected with the
national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction
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Act, with the amendment that its prohibitions were criminal only when
accompanied by “intent or reason to believe that the information is to be
used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation.”22

by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any
of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel,
aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in
time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the
subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement
with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with
any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the
United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President
by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in
which anything for the use of the Army, Navy or Air Force is being
prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited
place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the
national defense; or
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason
to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take,
make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document,
writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or
attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source
whatever, any such document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,
instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national
defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives
or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been
or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person
contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or
being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,
model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense,
or information relating to the national defense which information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the
United States entitled to receive it . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id.
22
40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version included in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006)). See supra
note 21. The provisions extended the 1911 Act significantly, as they include prohibitions
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As debate concerning the Act was ongoing, President Wilson’s
administration encouraged Congress to include in the Act a provision
that would enable the prosecution of persons or entities that published
any type of defense information.23 The section was eventually defeated
by close votes in both houses of Congress.24 The only prohibition against
publication that was passed is now included in 18 U.S.C. § 794(b), which
mandates punishment for the publication of military information in a
time of war with intent or reason to believe that the United States will be
injured or a foreign nation will be aided.25

against those persons who possess both lawful and illegally-obtained national defense
information. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1005-06.
23
The proposal provided that:
[d]uring any national emergency resulting from a war to which the
United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President
may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and, by
proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the
attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the
national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is
or might be useful to the enemy. Whoever violates any such
prohibition shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both: Provided, That
nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any
discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the
Government or its representatives or the publication of the same.
55 CONG. REC. 1763; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940.
24
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 956. The Senate defeated bill 8148 by a vote of 39 to
38, with 19 Senators choosing not to vote. Id. The bill would have prohibited, in wartime
but without any culpability requirement, a person or entity from publishing or
communicating a large range of defense information, including information regarding
movement of armed forces, war materials, plans of military operations, “or any other
information relating to the public defense or calculated to be, or which might be, useful to
the enemy.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Edgar & Schmidt, supra
note 16, at 947. Republican Senator Albert B. Cummins claimed that the act gave too much
power to the executive branch. Id. He argued that “[u]nder this provision the President
can absolutely command silence in the United States upon every subject mentioned . . . .
He can suppress every suggestion concerning the national defense in every newspaper of
the land.” 54 CONG. REC. 3492 (1917); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 947. A similar
provision in the House bill was defeated by a vote of 221 to 167, with one answering
“present” and 43 abstaining. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 960-61.
25
18 U.S.C. § 794(b) provides:
Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or
communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the
movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of
the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States,
or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct
of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or
measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the
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In 1938, Congress passed three additional sections of the Espionage
Statutes which dealt with photographing and military installations and
subsequent publishing or sale of them.26 These statutes, which are
relatively straightforward, produced very little congressional debate,
and few prosecutions have stemmed from them.27
One additional subsection of section 793, inserted in 1950, must be
mentioned before a deeper discussion of the statutes’ language can be
examined.28 Following World War II, Congress passed the Internal
Security Act of 1950, which included section 793(e), prohibiting anyone
who had unauthorized defense information from the willful
communication of it to those persons or entities not entitled to receive
it.29 Additionally, Congress created an offense for the simple retention of
such material.30

fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating
to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id.; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940-41. President Wilson’s provision was
defeated in part because Wilson’s political opponents feared that it could be used to silence
criticism of America’s entrance into the World War I. Id. at 941. It was feared that any
disapproval of foreign affairs could be muffled via the excuse that it was protecting
national security secrets. Id.; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage
Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 346-49 (2003) (discussing the heated
debate over the “press censorship” provision).
26
18 U.S.C. §§ 795-97 (2006).
27
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1071.
28
See infra Part III.A.
29
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006). In full, the statute reads:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument,
appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information
relating to the national defense which information the possessor has
reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to
the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers,
transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not
entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it
to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive
it…[s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
Id.; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1022 (commenting “that for the third time in
as many attempts, Congress had virtually no understanding of the language and effect of
793(d) and (e)”).
30
18 U.S.C. § 793(e).
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As mentioned earlier, phrases such as “intent or reason to believe
that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to
the advantage of any foreign nation,” “relating to the national defense,”
and “any person not entitled to receive it” are located throughout the
Espionage Act.31 Extensive scholarly writings have attempted to bring
understanding to these ambiguous phrases, with little success.32 Indeed,
when two Columbia law professors, Harold Edgar and Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., analyzed the statutes in the 1970s, in what is perhaps the
definitive examination of the provisions, they concluded that “the
statutes implacably resist the effort to understand.”33
The legislative history of sections 793 and 794 indicates that although
Congress refused to pass President Wilson’s broad press censorship
proposal, it instead adopted these statutes, and in doing so did not
intend to prohibit journalists from publishing defense information.34
However, the plain language of the statutes themselves does not exclude
the publication of defense information from their prohibitive reach.35
Thus, although there continues to be uncertainty as to whether a
journalist could be prosecuted under these statutes after publishing
national security secrets, there does exist one other Federal Criminal
Code provision that, after examining both its legislative history and its
plain language, points towards the likely permittance of such
prosecution.36

31
Such phrases are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(e) and 794(a). For clarification
purposes, throughout the rest of this Note, when “Espionage Act” is mentioned, it will
refer only to 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794.
32
See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 (E.D. Va. 2006) (stating that
the Act has been “criticized . . . as excessively complex, confusing, indeed impenetrable.”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(commenting that § 793(e) as a “singularly opaque statute”); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note
16, at 941-42 (“Unfortunately, the proponents of culpability requirements were more
concerned with obtaining their inclusion than elucidating their meaning. Ambiguity
pervades the Espionage Act . . . .”); Jereen Trudell, Note, The Constitutionality of Section 793
of the Espionage Act and Its Application to Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 205, 211 (1986) (“[I]t
is impossible to determine exactly what Congress meant when it enacted the statute.”).
33
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 930.
34
Id. at 1057 (“Congress demonstrated by the narrowing and ultimate rejection of the
Wilson Administration’s broad proposed prohibition on publication of defense information
that it did not intend to enact prohibitions on publication or communication motivated by
the desire to engage in public debate or private discussion”).
35
Id. at 937 (“[T]he language of the statutes has to be bent somewhat to exclude
publishing national defense material from its [criminal] reach, and tortured to exclude from
criminal sanction preparatory conduct necessarily involved in almost every conceivable
publication” of military secrets).
36
See infra Part II.B.
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B. The COMINT Statute
In 1950, Congress passed another provision to the Federal Criminal
Code, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 798, which prohibited, among other things,
the willful publishing of classified United States information related to
communication intelligence.37 In enacting this provision, Congress
37

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/6

18 U.S.C. § 798. The statute, titled “Disclosure of [C]lassified [I]nformation,” provides:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes,
transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or
publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of
the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the
detriment of the United States any classified information–
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code,
cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any
foreign government; or
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or
repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any
foreign government for cryptographic or communication
intelligence purposes; or
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of
the United States or any foreign government; or
(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence
from the communications of any foreign government,
knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes –
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
(b) As used in this subsection (a) of this section –
The term “classified information” means information which, at the
time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security,
specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;
The terms “code,” “cipher,” and “cryptographic system” include in
their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of
secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used
for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance,
or meanings of communications;
The term “foreign government” includes in its meaning any person or
persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction,
party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a
foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person
or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country,
whether or not such government is recognized by the United States;
The term “communications intelligence” means all procedures and
methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining
of information from such communications by other than the intended
recipients;
The term “unauthorized person” means any person who, or agency
which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set
forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head
of a department or agency of the United States Government which is
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targeted a very narrow category of information that it deemed crucially
important to be protected from our nation’s enemies.38 The provision,
which has come be known as the COMINT statute, was enacted in direct
response to a newspaper article published by the Chicago Tribune in the
midst of World War II.39 Shortly following America’s victory over Japan
at the battle of Midway, the Tribune ran a front-page article that disclosed
the highly secretive information that the strength, nature, and even
individual ship names of the approaching Japanese task forces were
known to the United States commanders days prior to the engagement,
with the reasonable conclusion that Japan’s naval codes had been
broken.40 Since its exposure threatened to lengthen the war and thus
lead to further military deaths, both the War Department and Justice
Department encouraged a prosecution under the Espionage Act, and by
August 1942, prosecutors had brought the issue before a federal grand
jury.41 However, the government subsequently decided to drop the
charges to eliminate the risk of disseminating additional classified
information to the jurors.42 Even if charges had been brought to finality,
expressly designated by the President to engage in communication
intelligence activities for the United States.
Id.
38
H.R. Rep. No. 81-1895, at 2 (1950). The House Judiciary Committee concluded that
Section 798 “is an attempt to provide just such legislation for only a small category of
classified matter, a category which is both vital and vulnerable to an almost unique
degree.” Id.
39
Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the New York Times Violated the Espionage Act?, COMMENTARY,
Mar. 2006, at 24-25 (discussing possible statutes that could or could not be utilized against
the New York Times for its disclosure of the classified NSA program). COMINT simply
stands for communications intelligence, and:
refers to those activities that produce intelligence by interception and
processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other
electromagnetic means . . . and by the processing of foreign encrypted
communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search,
intercept, and direction-finding.
Processing comprises range
estimation, transmitter operator identification, signal analysis, traffic
analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plaintext, the fusion of
these processes, and the reporting of the results . . . .
DESMOND BALL, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 122 (1993) (quoting
U.S. National Security Council Directive no. 6, 17 Feb. 1972).
40
See Navy Had Work of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 7, 1942, at A1. The
critical information, attributed to “reliable sources in . . . naval intelligence,” disclosed one
of the outstanding breakthroughs of Allied forces in the war, which would surely continue
to serve American war efforts to a great degree if Japan did not know that it had been
broken and continued to use the same cryptographic system. Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at
24.
41
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25.
42
Id. Additionally, the Japanese continued to use their same cryptographic system, JN25, either because they never learned of the Tribune article, or persisted to believe that their
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it is questionable whether the newspaper or its journalists would have
been convicted under sections 793 or 794.43
Thus, in Congress’ passage of section 798, it certainly had the Tribune
incident in mind when it directed criminal sanctions at disclosures of
sensitive communications intelligence.44 Indeed, Congress twice had
refused to adopt a measure that would have made a person’s
unauthorized disclosure of any classified information subject to criminal
prosecution.45 Therefore, the COMINT statute was drafted especially
with the rationale of balancing public debate and the necessary security
of national defense material and information.46
Moreover, the COMINT statute as written and enacted was a “model
of precise draftsmanship.”47 As the provision unambiguously asserts via
its explicit use of the word “publishes,” section 798 is a proscription
upon public speech that is directly aimed at preventing newspapers,
magazines, and similar media from making known certain
communications intelligence.48
Additionally, the law’s mens rea
requirement is met upon knowingly and willfully accomplishing the
forbidden disclosure, without any additional condition that the
information be used to injure the United States or aid a foreign country.49
Moreover, Congress dodged additional potential application difficulties
by declining to include any prerequisite that America be at war.50
Perhaps indicating the overwhelming support of the statute, and in
light of the recent Chicago Tribune article and the deliberate contraction to
codes were unbreakable. Id. at 24-25; see generally DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS (1967)
(explaining the history of secret communications, including the Japanese in World War II).
43
See infra Part III.A.
44
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28.
45
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1056. See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. Doc. No. 79-244 (1946); S. 1019, 80th
Cong. (1950); S. 2680, 80th Cong. (1950). The proposals would have criminalized the
“revelation or publication, not only of direct information about United States codes and
ciphers themselves but of information transmitted in United States codes and ciphers.”
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1068. Such provisions would have prohibited
publication regarding a large amount of military and diplomatic dispatches and
information sent by the government via codes and ciphers both internationally and
intranationally. Id.
46
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28.
47
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065.
48
Id.; see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28.
49
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065.
50
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28; see also Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of
War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the official declaration of
war in the United States).
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the narrow amount of information prohibited by the statute, the House
of Representatives passed section 798 without substantive debate.51
Moreover, the Senate conducted very little discussion prior to passing it,
as well.52 As Edgar and Schmidt have pointed out, the provision had
been drafted “with concern for public speech having been thus
respected,” and had even been supported by the American Society of
Newspaper Editors.53
C. The Pentagon Papers: Watering the Seeds of Prosecution
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case concerning the
balance of the right to know and the need to withhold is New York Times
Co. v. United States.54 The thrust of the case was an attempt by the
government to receive injunctive relief against the New York Times and
the Washington Post in order to prohibit them from continuing to publish
the contents of the classified and highly secretive Pentagon Papers.55 In a
per curiam decision, the Court determined that the government failed to
meet the heavy burden required to justify the imposition of a prior
restraint against the newspapers.56 However, the nine individual
opinions that followed indicated a splintered Court regarding the
Justices’ reasoning, dicta, and policy concerns.57

96 CONG. REC. 6082 (1950).
95 CONG. REC. 2774 (1949).
53
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1069. In one of history’s ironic twists, the main
editors of the New York Times were active members of the American Society of Newspaper
Editors. Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28.
54
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The litigation has come to be
known as the Pentagon Papers case, named after the Defense Department study detailing
American involvement in Vietnam. Id. at 714. The study, commissioned by Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, was officially titled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process
on Vietnam Policy.” Id. A federal district court in New York refused to issue the
injunction requested by the government to stop the publishing of sections of the study in
the Times. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and approved the injunction. United States v.
N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1971).
55
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. Importantly, the Government argued only for an
injunction, and its brief lacked any mention of the espionage statutes, presumably because
no section authorizes injunctive, but rather only criminal, relief. See also Edgar & Schmidt,
supra note 16, at 931.
56
Id. at 714.
57
Id. at 713. Justice Black and Justice Douglas each wrote a concurring opinion, while
joining each other. The same can be said for Justices Stewart and White. Justice Brennan
authored a concurring opinion, as did Justice Marshall. Justice Harlan wrote the principal
dissent, which was also joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Finally, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun each wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
51
52
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A brief examination of the differing opinions denotes the fractured
nature of the Justices’ rationales.58 Justices Black and Douglas indicated
that they believed the First Amendment is an absolute, in that no
governmental restraints can be placed on the press’ right to publish any
and all information.59 While Justice Brennan’s concurrence did not go to
such an extreme, he did assert that the First Amendment bars the
judiciary from stopping the publication of material that a newspaper
already has in its possession.60
More pertinent to the issue of this Note were the opinions of the
remaining six Justices. First, Justice Stewart, while concurring that the
injunction should not be granted, did concede that Congress has the
power and ability to pass criminal laws to protect secret government
information.61 Although he did not specifically name section 798, Justice
Stewart stated that “Congress has passed such laws, and several of them
are of very colorable relevance” to the case at hand.62 Moreover, Justice
White expended a substantial portion of his opinion to further elaborate
upon possible criminal prosecutions.63 Explicitly referring to section 798
as a provision of the Criminal Code that would allow prosecutions
against publishers, Justice White noted that he would not hesitate to
sustain a conviction if the elements of the statute were met.64
Justice Marshall, while maintaining that there may have been a
criminal statute that fit the facts of the Pentagon Papers situation,
commented that various provisions did in fact criminalize the
dissemination of certain government secrets.65
Yet, through his
See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring); see id. at 720 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
60
Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62
Id. Justice Stewart went on to assert that, if the government decided to proceed with
criminal sanctions under the appropriate statutes, it would be the duty of the judicial
branch to enforce them if constitutional. Id.
63
Id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 735. Justice White stated, “I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions
under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the
imposition of a prior restraint.” Id. at 737. Another section that Justice White pointed to for
possible prosecution in this situation was 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). Id. at 737-40; cf. 403 U.S. at 745
(Marshall, J., concurring); infra note 65 (discussing the powers of the legislature to create
laws that prohibited the disclosures of some classified government secrets).
65
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 743-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Congress has on several occasions given extensive consideration to the
problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United
States. This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes
making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and
58
59
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observations concerning several other similar statutes, Justice Marshall
made clear that it is the province of the legislature to criminalize certain
disclosures, and the courts have the ultimate responsibility to enforce
them.66
Furthermore, the three dissenters from the per curiam opinion also
shed additional light on the issue of whether criminal sanctions were
possible in situations where national defense information is published.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger explicitly approved of the notions of Justice
White’s concurrence regarding the application of criminal punishment.67
Although the remaining two dissenters, Justices Harlan and Blackmun,
did not overtly assert that criminal statutes existed which could be
employed against the publishers, they did not explicitly disapprove of
this view, as they would have granted the injunction against publishing
the Pentagon Papers altogether.68
Heeding the guidance of these Supreme Court Justices, the
government soon thereafter brought a fifteen-count indictment against
the New York Times reporters who compiled and published the Pentagon
Papers, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.69 The indictment charged

publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and
information. The bulk of these statutes is found in chapter 37 of U. S.
C., Title 18, entitled Espionage and Censorship.
Id. at 743.
66
Id. at 743-47. Justice Marshall also referenced previous attempts ultimately defeated
by Congress that would have prohibited publishing certain government secrets. Id. at 74647; see also supra notes 23-24 (describing President Wilson’s broad censorship proposal that
was eventually defeated by Congress). In 1957, the United States Commission on
Government Security proposed an ultimately-defeated provision to Congress, stating that
Congress should “enact legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to disclose
without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, information classified ‘secret’ or
‘top secret,’ knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to have
been so classified.” N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 747 (quoting the Report of Commission of
Government Security, 619-20 (1957)).
67
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 748, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating “I should add that
I am in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect
to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or information
relating to the national defense”).
68
Id. at 753-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Id. at 759-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69
Melville B. Nimmer, National Security v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the
Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974). Ellsberg, who was a member of the Defense
Department commission that researched and authored the Pentagon Papers, was in
possession of the Papers between August 1969 and May 1970. Id. at 312. During this time
period, Ellsberg admittedly took them from his top secret safe and copied them at a
location ten miles away. Id. at 313. Russo also admitted to helping Ellsberg achieve this
task. Id.
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the defendants with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e)70 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 641.71 However, all charges were dismissed against Ellsberg and Russo
when Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr., granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss due to government misconduct.72 As a result of this limited
victory for Ellsberg and Russo, the merits of the case were never
resolved, leaving commentators to ponder the hypothetical
implications.73
While the Pentagon Papers case only tangentially affects possible
prosecutions under the COMINT statute, it points toward the possibility
of the prosecution of journalists for their publication of certain classified
information.74 Moreover, following the dismissal of the Ellsberg case for
reasons other than the merits of the case, “[t]he specter of Ellsberg hangs
over government officials, newsmen, and others who may in the future
wish to disclose to the public vital governmental documents.”75 In the
decades since these cases, few cases have considered the issue, but those
that have are indicative of the judicial trend toward protection of
national security.76
D. Tightening the National Security Screws
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, as both foreign and
domestic United States policy was influenced by the Cold War and
nuclear proliferation, the necessity of government secrecy increased, as

See supra notes 21 and 29 for the full text of the provisions.
18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). This provision criminalizes, among other things, the stealing,
converting, and embezzling of government documents, which in this case included the
Pentagon Papers. Nimmer, supra note 69, at 315. The application of this statute is outside
the scope of this Note.
72
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 353 F. Supp. 515, 516 n.1 (D.D.C. 1973) (citing United States v.
Russo, No. 9373-(WMB)-CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973)). The
court granted the motion to dismiss due to “the totality of government misconduct,
including the suppression of evidence, the invasion of the physician-patient relationship,
the illegal wiretapping, the destruction of relevant documents and disobedience to judicial
orders.” Nimmer, supra note 69, at 311. Judge Byrne implemented this language in his oral
grounds for dismissal, which coincided with the language of the defendants’ oral motion to
dismiss. Id. at 311 n.2.
73
See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 69 (discussing the possible outcome of the Ellsberg and
Russo prosecution had the case been judged on its merits, concluding that they would have
been found not guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 641, and that 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)–(e) would have
been found unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth).
74
See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
75
Nimmer, supra note 69, at 312.
76
See infra Part II.D.
70
71
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both classic spies and leaks to the press became a serious problem.77
Such media related activity and, in at least one case, subsequent
prosecution, was evident in United States v. Morison.78 In Morison, the
government brought charges against Samuel Morison for violating
sections 793 (d) and (e) of the Espionage Act after he provided classified
photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to a British magazine, which were
taken by a secret reconnaissance satellite.79 When the District Court of
Maryland convicted Morison under sections 793(d) and (e), it was the
first time a court determined that the Espionage Act could be
successfully applied to the act of providing documents or information to
a member of the media, as opposed to an agent of a foreign
government.80
On appeal, Morison argued that the provisions did not apply to this
situation, because prosecutions under the Espionage Act had never been
used against a person in his position.81 However, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the government that the literal words of
the statutes did not prohibit such a conviction.82 Importantly, the court
expressly stated that simply because prosecutions under a provision are
infrequent, it does not follow that the statutory language should be
invalidated.83 As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s
conviction of a two-year prison term.84

77
See Thomas S. Martin, National Security and the First Amendment: A Change in
Perspective, 68 A.B.A. J. 680 (1982). Martin, a deputy assistant attorney general in the Civil
Division of the Department of Justice during the Carter administration, stated that a large
portion of disclosures came not from spies but from authors and journalists who made
previously-classified information public through media outlets. Id. at 680-81. This was
because “[t]hey were idealists convinced that the world would be a better place if
particular secret information were available to the public. They were journalists who took
from Vietnam and Watergate the proposition that disclosure of government secrets is
inherently a public service and even a primary responsibility of the profession.” Id. at 681.
78
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
79
Id. at 1060-61. Morison, a former civilian analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support
Center (“NISC”) in Suitland, Maryland, had been employed from 1974 until October 1984.
Id. at 1060. Additionally, he worked as a part-time editor of the British magazine Jane’s
Fighting Ships. Id. Due to his dissatisfaction at the NISC and in an attempt to gain a
promotion with the magazine, Morison passed along three classified photographs of the
Soviet carrier to the editor-in-chief of Jane’s Fighting Ships, Derek Wood. Id. at 1060-61.
80
604 F. Supp. 655 (Md. 1985); see also David H. Topol, United States v. Morison: A
Threat to the First Amendment Right to Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV.
581, 590 (1992) (arguing that Morison set an alarming precedent by interpreting sections
793(d) and (e) to allow media-related prosecutions, as opposed to classic spy situations).
81
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1063.
82
Id. at 1067.
83
Id. at 1067.
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Additionally, a case is currently being litigated that has a bearing on
the constant balance between national security and press leaks.85 United
States v. Rosen86 involves the actions of two officials of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”), a Washington, D.C. lobbyist
group.87 The AIPAC officials, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, were
accused of receiving classified information from Lawrence Franklin, an
employee of the Defense Department, and then conspiring to transfer the
information to an Israeli diplomat and members of the media.88 Rosen
and Weissman were both charged with violating sections 793(e) and (g),
while Rosen was additionally charged with violating section 793(d).89

[T]he rarity of prosecution under the statutes does not indicate that the
statutes were not to be enforced as written. We think in any event that
the rarity of the use of the statute as a basis for prosecution is at best
questionable for nullifying the clear language of the statute, and we
think the revision of 1950 and its reenactment of section 793(d)
demonstrate that Congress did not consider such statute meaningless
or intend that the statute and its prohibitions were to be abandoned.
Id.
84
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25. The court also determined that the statutes met other
constitutional hurdles, such as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. Id. Over a
decade after his release from prison, Morison received a full pardon in 2001 from President
Clinton on his last day in office. Id. at 25 n.5.
85
Id. at 25.
86
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
87
Id. AIPAC has been described as one of the “most influential lobbying organizations”
in Washington, one which lobbied on issues relating to American foreign policy in the
Middle East. Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, 2 Senior AIPAC Employees Ousted, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2005, at A08.
88
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09. Franklin was a mid-level worker on the Iran desk in
the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Defense, who held a top secret security
clearance during the alleged illegal actions. Id. Following an alleged conspiracy by
disclosing information to Rosen and Weissman beginning in late 2002, Franklin began to
cooperate with the FBI in July of 2004. Id. at 608-10.
On October 5, 2005, Franklin pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
communicate national defensey information to one not entitled to
receive it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (g), and to one count
of conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a
foreign government in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 783 and 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Id. at 608 n.3. Franklin was sentenced to a prison term of twelve-and-a-half years, which
will be reviewed following the trial of Rosen and Weissman. Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at
25-26.
89
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 610. Their indictment maintains that they used “their
contacts within the U.S. government and elsewhere to gather sensitive U.S. government
information, including classified information relating to national defense, for subsequent
unlawful communication, delivery, and transmission to persons not entitled to receive it.”
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25. Rosen’s additional charge was based on his alleged aiding
and abetting Franklin’s transmission of a fax of classified document. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d
at 610.
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In August of 2006, a district court in Virginia convicted Rosen and
Weissman of all charges.90 Despite the defendants’ challenges of asapplied vagueness, facial overbreadth, and transgression of their First
Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government, the
court asserted that the plain language of the provisions applied to
classified information that had been “leaked” to them.91
The court discounted the defendants’ assertion that because section
793(e) had never been applied to prosecute persons in their situation, it
thus violated the fair warning element of the vagueness doctrine.92
Rosen and Weissman, as non-government persons, argued that the intent
of the statute was not to punish disseminators of already leaked
information, thus the prosecution was “novel and unprecedented.”93
However, the court decided that the plain language of the statute
prevailed under these circumstances, regardless of the fact that the
defendants were non-government personnel.94
The AIPAC case is instructive because it highlights the issue of
national security secrecy.
First, Rosen and Weissman were not
government employees, and thus Rosen stands, at least in part, for the
proposition that the Espionage Act can be successfully applied to
persons to whom information is leaked in the first place.95 Moreover, the
district court determined that the language of the statutes was
sufficiently clear to pass constitutional scrutiny and was not overbroad.96
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
Id. at 628.
92
Id. at 627-28.
93
Id. The court emphasized that “labeling an event a ‘leak’ does not remove the event
from the statute’s scope. At best, the term ‘leak’ is a euphemism used to imply or suggest
to a careless reader that the transmission of the information was somehow authorized. . . .
[D]efendants frequent use of ‘leak’ as a characterization of what occurred is unavailing.”
Id. at 628-29.
94
Id. at 628. The court reasoned that “[i]n amending the statute in 1950, Congress made
it quite clear that the statute was intended to apply to the transmission of national defense
information by non-government employees by adding subsection (e).” Id. at 628 n.38.
95
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 26. There was not a violation of due process, as the
defendants had argued, claiming that this prosecution was a “novel construction of a
criminal statute . . . that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly
disclosed to be within its scope.” Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 627. The defendants also
asserted that they did not have fair warning that the statute applied to them, but the
Morison decision had also considered the same argument and rejected it there as well. Id. at
628; see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
96
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 643; but see District Court Holds That Recipients of Government
Leaks Who Disclose Information “Related to the National Defense” May Be Prosecuted Under the
Espionage Act, 120 HARV. L. REV. 821, 823-24 (2007) (asserting that the Rosen decision was
90
91
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Finally, the indictment and subsequent conviction of Rosen and
Weissman indicate that it is illegal both to gain possession of classified
information and subsequently forward it to others, including a “member
of the media.”97 However, what if Rosen and Weissman, as opposed to
passing along the information secretly, had instead written an article and
published it on the front page of a major national newspaper?
E. The New York Times and its Disclosures
Within the past several years, the New York Times has published
prominent articles that have disclosed two classified anti-terrorist
programs that were illegally leaked to it from anonymous sources inside
the United States’ government.98 First, on December 16, 2005, the New
York Times published a front-page article under the headline “Bush Lets
U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts.”99 The article, written by journalists
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, described the existence of a highly
classified terrorist surveillance program conducted by the National
Security Agency (“NSA”) and the manner in which it operated.100
Second, Lichtblau and Risen authored another article, published in the
New York Times on June 23, 2006, titled “Bank Data Sifted in Secret by
U.S. to Block Terror,” which disclosed the manner in which the
government tracks the finances of suspected terrorists.101

incorrect, as the Espionage Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to situations where
the First Amendment is implicated); see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
97
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (asserting that even if such a transmission of information
relating to the national defense to the media was in his mind “an act of patriotism,” he
could still be convicted of willfully disclosing the information); see also Schoenfeld, supra
note 39, at 26.
98
See infra notes 99, 101.
99
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. The article was a precursor to Risen’s impending publication of a book
detailing at length, among other intelligence matters, the NSA program that was the subject
of the Times’ article. See generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR (2006).
100
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99.
101
Eric Lichblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1. Barclay Walsh also contributed to the article. Id. Similar
articles were published the same day in two other major American newspapers, the Los
Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal. See Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, Secret U.S. Program
Tracks Global Bank Transfers, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury
Tracks Financial Data in Search Effort, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 23, 2006, at A1; Editorial, Fit
and Unfit to Print, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 30, 2006, available at http://www.
opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008585
(explaining
that
because
government officials had not told the Wall Street Journal that it had urged the New York
Times not to publish the story, the Journal went forth with publication).
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Relying on numerous anonymous government officials, the
December 2005 article disclosed that the NSA program, authorized by a
2002 presidential order, allowed the NSA to monitor international
telephone and e-mail communications between people inside the
country and suspected terrorist-related persons outside the United
States.102
The program allowed the NSA to monitor such
communications without applying for warrants from the Foreign
Intelligence Security Act (“FISA”) courts, the 1978 legislation that had
previously authorized such surveillance.103 The government has argued
that Congress empowered the President to create the program when it
enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) shortly
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.104 The NSA program has
been praised by the administration and its supporters as one of the most
crucial anti-terrorism weapons employed by the United States since the

102
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1 (“[n]early a dozen current and former officials,
who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program, discussed it
with reporters for The New York Times because of their concerns about the operation’s
legality and oversight”). At least one of the anonymous sources has been reported as
Russell Tice, a former longtime employee of the NSA. Brian Ross, NSA Whistleblower
Alleges Illegal Spying (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/
Investigation/story?id=1491889.
103
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99. The constitutionality of the program has been
greatly questioned, especially by politicians, civil libertarians, and interest groups.
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 23; see, e.g., Washington in Brief (Feb. 14, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/13/AR200602130200
6.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (discussing the fact that the American Bar Association had
denounced the program as unconstitutional); see also CNN, Bush: Secret Wiretaps Have
Disrupted Potential Attacks (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/
nsa/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“‘This administration is playing fast and loose
with the law in national security. The issue here is whether the president of the United
States is putting himself above the law, and I believe he has done so.’”) (quoting Wisconsin
Democratic Senator Russ Feingold). Following the article’s publishing, President Bush
declared that he did instruct the NSA to “intercept the international communications of
people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations[,]” but that before
such surveillance, “the government must have information that establishes a clear link to
these terrorist networks.”
The White House, President’s Radio Address,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2006).
104
The AUMF states:
[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
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attacks of September 11th to disrupt and thwart future plots.105 Several
government officials have publicly proclaimed that the program was a
central tool in fighting terror.106 The importance of the secrecy of the
program was highlighted by the fact that Bush administration officials
pleaded with the Times not to publish the details of the classified
program.107
In August of 2006, a federal district court held the program
unconstitutional as a violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, in
addition to the separation of powers doctrine.108 On appeal, however, on
105
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1. Although the extent to which the NSA
program has been successful is still unknown, it has been credited with discovering the
plot of terrorist Iyman Faris, the American citizen who pled guilty in 2003 to plotting to
topple the Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches. Id. Additionally, an al Qaeda plan to
employ fertilizer bomb attacks on British bars and train stations was uncovered in 2004
partly from information gathered through the NSA program. Id.; see also, e.g., Pierre
Thomas, Mary Walsh & Jason Ryan, Officials Search for Terrorist Next Door (Sept. 8, 2003),
available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129090&page.
106
Gabriel Schoenfeld, Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 6,
2006),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/060606schoenfeld.
pdf#search=%22edgar%20schmidt%20bent%20tortured%20sanction%22.
The National
Intelligence Director, John Negroponte, has described the NSA program as “crucial for
protecting the nation against its most menacing threat.” Id. “FBI director Robert Mueller
has [stated that the program] has ‘been valuable in identifying would-be terrorists in the
United States.’” Id. Former director of the NSA and current Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, General Michael Hayden, asserted that it was his “professional
judgment that if we had had this program in place [before 9/11], we would have identified
some of the al-Qaeda operatives in the United States.” Id. Porter Goss, former Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency and predecessor of General Hayden, referred to the
disclosure of the NSA program as having caused “very severe” damage to United States’
intelligence collection capabilities. Id. Jane Harman, the ranking Democratic member of
the House Intelligence Committee, maintained “that the disclosure of the NSA program
‘damaged critical intelligence capabilities.’” Id.
107
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1. The Times decided to delay publication for
over a year after it first met with administration officials to conduct more investigation. Id.;
see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 24.
108
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754
(E.D. Mich. 2006). The court found that because the wiretaps were not implemented in
accordance with FISA, the “program . . . [is] obviously in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 775. Additionally, the court reasoned that because of the nature of the
chilling effect the wiretaps had on the speech of the plaintiffs, their First Amendment rights
were also violated. Id. at 776. Finally, the court asserted that because the Congress enacted
FISA, and the President violated its provisions, the Separation of Powers doctrine was
infringed. Id. at 779; see also Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire:
Assessing the Constitutionally of the National Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping
Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429 (2006) (claiming that the
program cannot withstand legitimate constitutional scrutiny).
The ruling was
subsequently appealed by the government to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
granted the government’s request to delay the application of the injunction. Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006).
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July 6, 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district
court’s order and dismissed the action because the plaintiffs lacked
standing for their claims.109 The court held that the plaintiffs, which
included lawyers, academics, and journalists who often had contact with
people who they believed were targets of the NSA program, failed to
meet the standing requirement under any of their six claims.110
However, after the district court’s determination of the program’s
illegality, but before the Sixth Circuit reversed that decision, in January
of 2007, the Bush administration decided not to reauthorize the NSA
program.111 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent a letter to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in which he maintained that all government
electronic surveillance will be first endorsed by the FISA courts.112 While
Gonzales claimed that court orders by a judge of the FISA court will
allow for sufficiently quick responses to administration requests for
warrants, some in the media questioned why the Bush administration
seemingly altered its position on the issue.113
Nearly six months after the NSA disclosure, the Times once again
published an article describing another top secret program, commonly
known as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (“TFTP”).114 A
109
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2007)
(the majority was written by Circuit Judge Alice M. Batchelder, with a concurring opinion
by Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, and Circuit Judge Ronald Lee Gilman dissenting).
110
Id. at 659-83. The claims asserted by the plaintiffs included a First Amendment free
speech challenge, a Fourth Amendment privacy challenge, a separation of powers
challenge, a review under the Administrative Procedure Act, a challenge under Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and a challenge under FISA. Id.
111
Prepared Opening Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Justice
Department Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 18, 2007).
112
Id. In particular, Gonzales asserted that “surveillance into or out of the United States
where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or
agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization [will be] subject to the approval of
the FISA Court.” Id.
113
See, e.g., Rob Hendin, Why Warrantless Wiretapping Is No More (Jan. 19, 2007), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/19/politics/main2376652.shtml; Andrew
C. McCarthy, The ACLU Loses in Court, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, July 23, 2007, at 17-18
(explaining that because FISA requires a probable cause standard to be met before
surveillance of a foreign person may occur, and the Fourth Amendment authorizes
searches when the much less stringent standard of reasonableness is met, FISA does not
allow surveillance on everyone the nation needs to monitor during this war); David B.
Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Surveillance Showdown (Sept. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110010670
(questioning
whether “any sane country [would] purposefully limit its ability to spy on enemy
communications in time of war,” concluding that “for the first time in history, the U.S. is
asked to collect less intelligence about the enemy while prosecuting a war.”)
114
Lichblau & Risen, supra note 101.
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Treasury Department program operated in conjunction with the CIA, the
TFTP monitors a network of worldwide financial institutions without the
knowledge of many banks or their customers.115
In contrast to the NSA program, there have been few concrete
objections to the TFTP claiming that it is an unconstitutional program,
other than a supposed lack of oversight.116 This is because SWIFT is
required to give this information to nations under a 1977 statute, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), when
subpoenaed by governments pursuant to a Presidential declaration of
national emergency.117
Accordingly, there has been a large amount of critical response to the
decision by the Times to publish both the Risen and Lichtblau articles.118
Foremost, President Bush labeled the disclosure of the NSA program as a
“shameful act.”119 Moreover, the President has indicated his concern
that the disclosures will cause targets of the program to change their

115
Meyer & Miller, supra note 101, at 1. The major conglomeration that allowed the U.S.
to monitor their records is formally known as the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 101, at A1. SWIFT
operates when banks from all around the globe issue international, often overseas,
completed monetary transfers, but does not provide information regarding individual bank
account information. Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (July
11, 2006), at 1, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp05.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
Additionally, SWIFT contains no information about most normal domestic transactions in
the United States, such as ATM withdrawals, checks, or deposits. Id. at 2.
116
Meyer & Miller, supra note 101, at 2. “Critics complain that these efforts are not
subject to independent governmental reviews designed to prevent abuse, and charge that
they collide with privacy and consumer protection laws in the United States.” Id.
117
Levey, supra note 115, at 2. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
President Bush soon thereafter issued Executive Order 13224, which is the basis for the
required subpoenas. Id. The Order is renewed yearly as the terrorist threat has continued.
Id.
118
See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
119
NBC News and News Services, Bush Says Leaking Spy Program a ‘Shameful Act’ (Dec.
20, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10530417/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). Bush
promised to continue to employ the NSA program “for so long as the nation faces the
continuing threat of an enemy that wants to kill American citizens.” Id. The American
Society of Newspapers Editors issued a news release that supported the actions of the
Times, stating in part that “[t]he administration of President George W. Bush and some
members of Congress are threatening America’s bedrock values of free speech and free
press with their attempts to demonize newspapers for fulfilling their constitutional roles in
our democratic society.” American Society of Newspapers Editors, ASNE Criticizes
President, Lawmakers for Attacks on Newspapers (June 30, 2006), http://www.asne.org/
index.cfm?ID=6346 (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
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tactics.120 In the weeks following the disclosure of the NSA program, the
Justice Department began an investigation into the source of the leaked
national security information.121
In an even more public confrontation, Treasury Secretary John W.
Snow responded to the TFTP program disclosure by writing a letter to
the editor to the New York Times, demonstrating the government’s anger
at its decision to publish the article.122 Furthermore, at least one
prominent member of the House of Representatives, then-Chairman of
the House Homeland Security Committee Peter R. King, publicly
advocated the government to seek criminal charges against “the New
York Times—the reporters, the editors, and the publisher.”123 Days after
the TFTP article, the House of Representatives formally voted to
condemn the decision to disclose the program.124
While the decision by the Times to publish the existence and
operation of the programs caused a firestorm of criticism of both the
120
Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Bush Addresses Uproar over Spying (Dec. 20, 2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/
AR2005121900211_pf.html (quoting President Bush, “[t]he fact that we’re discussing this
program is helping the enemy”).
121
Toni Locy, Justice Dept. Opens Domestic Spying Probe (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8EQLIAGB&show_article=1. In August of
2007, the FBI searched the home of former Justice Department lawyer Thomas Tamm,
taking his computer, two laptops, and some personal files; however, investigation
continues and no charges have been brought against Mr. Tamm or any other person
regarding the leak. Associated Press, Report: FBI Searches Home of Attorney in Warrantless
Wiretap Program Case (August 5, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,292184,00.
html (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
122
John W. Snow, Bank Data Report: Treasury Dept.’s View, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at
A24. Secretary Snow asserted that the program was undermined by the disclosure, as
terrorists were notified about America’s method of tracking their financial activities. Id.
Moreover, Secretary Snow assailed the Times’ justification for publishing the article that the
terrorists knew their money trails were being monitored by stating “[t]he fact that your
editors believe themselves to be qualified to assess how terrorists are moving money
betrays a breathtaking arrogance and a deep misunderstanding of this program and how it
works.” Id.
123
Devlin Barrett, Lawmaker Wants Times Prosecuted (June 26, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/25/AR2006062500
675.html.
124
Rick Klein, House Votes to Condemn Media Over Terror Story (June 30, 2006), available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/06/30/house_votes_to_condemn_
media_over_terror_story/?page=1. The nonbinding “Sense of the Congress” resolution
states that the disclosure “may have placed the lives of Americans in danger” and that
Congress “expects the cooperation of all news media organizations” in ensuring the
secrecy of classified programs. Id. The resolution passed by a vote of 227-183, with
seventeen Democrats joining almost all House Republicans in condemning the publication.
Id.
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government and the media, the Times may also have crossed a legal
line.125 As the aforementioned statutes and case law suggest, limits exist
regarding the communication and publication of classified
information.126 Therefore, the next Part of this Note further explores
whether the relevant law will allow such a prosecution of the Times for
its publication of either the TFTP or NSA programs.127
III. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that while the Espionage
Act may be ambiguous, the COMINT statute is straightforward, and
strong policy rationales exist for enforcement of the latter’s provisions.128
First, Part III.A discusses the unambiguous nature of the COMINT
statute, especially in comparison to other provisions of the Espionage
Act.129 Next, Part III.B analyzes the manner in which the COMINT
statute protects sensitive national security information concerning
intelligence, and also discusses the strong public policy for limiting the
disclosure of confidential national security information.130 Finally, Part
III.C examines whether any of the provisions can or should apply to the
disclosure of the classified TFTP or NSA programs by the New York
Times.131
A. Espionage Act vs. COMINT Statute
In order to analyze the crucial differences between the Espionage Act
and the COMINT statute, the actual wording of the provisions,
legislative histories, and historical contexts must be examined.132 By
juxtaposing the words of the statutes, it is clear that as compared to the
earlier enacted provisions, the COMINT statute is indeed “a model of
precise draftsmanship.”133 The earlier Espionage Act included three
major areas where ambiguity exists concerning the provisions’ plain
meaning.134 First, there is uncertainty whether the publishing of
information is the kind of communication that is necessary to satisfy an
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

See infra Part III.C.
See supra Part II.A-D.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts III.A-C.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Parts II.A-B.
Edgar and Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying

text.
134
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element of the statutes.135 Additionally, the mens rea requirement that
the information be willfully communicated with intent to injure the
United States or to help another nation causes uncertainty, for it is a very
subjective and malleable standard.136 Finally, ambiguity exists perhaps
to the greatest extent regarding the type of information that is protected
by the statute, which includes the inherently ambiguous standard of
“information ‘relating to the national defense.’”137
In comparison, the COMINT statute contains straightforward
language and definitions that allow very little room for
misinterpretation.138 For example, the provision explicitly includes the
term “publishes” as a prohibition, and even sets it off by commas to
possibly emphasize it.139 Moreover, following the prohibitions of the
COMINT statute, the drafters included precise definitions of the words
“classified
information,”
“communication
intelligence,”
and
“unauthorized person.”140 Because there is no statutory element that the
United States be at war, it is clear that the section prohibits all such
disclosures, regardless of the intricacies of modern day declarations of
war.141
Additionally, the legislative histories and historical contexts of the
statutes shed light on their purposes.142 Congress had debated and
unequivocally refused to criminalize the publishing of all types of
defense information when it passed the precursors to the current
Espionage Act in 1917.143 However, the fact that Congress subsequently
passed the COMINT statute after World War II and the Chicago Tribune’s
Id. (discussing the Espionage Act and its corresponding legislative history that causes
confusion, since the plain language of sections 793(c)–(e) seems to criminalize almost any
acquisition by journalists of information relating to the national defense; however,
Congress “did not understand the provisions to have that effect, and they have never been
so employed”).
136
Id. at 1040 (determining that Congress did not fully appreciate the implications the
Espionage Act would have upon activities that it had not deliberately wanted to
criminalize).
137
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing how a plain reading of the statute
could prohibit the publishing of any defense related information).
138
See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 938.
139
See supra note 37 for the full text of the provision.
140
Id. The subsection also defines “code,” “cipher,” “cryptographic system,” and
“foreign government.” Id. Such helpful definitions are lacking from the other main
provisions of the Espionage Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794 (2000).
141
See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at
1065.
142
See supra Parts II.A-B.
143
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (describing the defeat of President
Wilson’s press censorship proposal).
135
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disclosure of cryptographic information after the Battle of Midway gives
overwhelming credence to the idea that Congress clearly meant to
prohibit the publication of communications intelligence.144
The
protection of this nation’s communications intelligence secrets were
essential then, and the significance of their protection has only increased
in the decades that have followed.145
B. It’s Secret for a Reason
When the Espionage Act was first enacted, Congress had national
security on its mind, because World War I had just ended.146 Congress
was again concerned with national security when it passed the COMINT
statute soon after World War II.147 Traditionally, the need to keep
information secret has been the greatest in wartime, when there are
troop, ship, and munitions movements, individual battle and long-term
theater strategies are precious, and the appearance of unity among allies
is essential.148 Even at the outset of the Cold War, the Espionage Act was
successfully applied, as it could be utilized proficiently against the
classic spies who fit the common definitions of espionage and treason.149
However, history has shown in numerous, and seemingly constant,
instances that declarations of war are not the only times when lives are
lost and property is destroyed. For example, during the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union never officially declared war upon
one another.150 Yet, the nations indirectly fought various contests

See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text; see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25
(explaining the way in which the Chicago Tribune’s publication of codebreaking secrets
following during World War II eventually led to the enactment of the COMINT statute).
145
See infra Part III.B.
146
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
147
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. The legislative histories of the statutes
also indicate as much. Id.
148
E.E.B. & K.E.M., Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the Conflict
Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open Government, 71 VA. L. REV. 801, 824
(1985). “[T]he maintenance of an effective national defense require[s] both confidentiality
and secrecy. . . . In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy
is, of course, self-evident.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
149
Martin, supra note 77, at 680. Perhaps the most unforgettable application of the
Espionage Act occurred during the 1950s trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg following their
furnishing of atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union. Id.
150
E.E.B. & K.E.M., supra note 148, at 824. Proxy wars occurred in Korea, Vietnam,
Angola, and Central America. Id. Certainly, countless other surrogate battles were fought
in other places, not only with lives, but with materials and financial assistance. Id.
144
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around the world, where thousands of lives were lost and collateral
destruction occurred.151
In these types of continuous struggles, interests and information
beyond that pertaining to military operations must be kept from
unintended nations and entities. Obviously important are defense
installations and features of weapon systems.152 Also, a nation’s prewar
contingency plans have not nearly the same value if enemies have such
strategies, for the latter can neutralize any advantages of the plans by
preparing countermeasures.153
Additionally, certain nonmilitary
technologies must also be protected during both peace and war, because
advances in research and development correspond directly to military
strength and battlefield success.154
Perhaps the most important secrecy interest is communications
intelligence, because it deals with intelligence methods, sources, and
operations.155 This type of intelligence is crucial because its objective is
to obtain information about foreign nations and entities, including
military capacities, internal political atmosphere, and diplomatic
options.156
Accordingly, information gained via communications
intelligence has the objectives of both guaranteeing efficient national
defense and also maintaining an effective foreign policy.157
Protecting the means by which such information is gathered can be
just as critical as the actual information that is collected. Keeping one’s
own nation’s communications intelligence methods secret ensures that
other nations or entities do not take substantive steps to stop the flow of
its information.158 Moreover, when an intelligence operation is ongoing,
it is very susceptible to failure if it is disclosed, because of the obvious

Id.
Id. The most evident among these include nuclear, chemical, and biological
weaponry.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 825.
155
Id.; see also supra note 39 (discussing a formal definition of COMINT). As compared to
other types of strict intelligence, such as electronic intelligence and foreign instrumental
signals intelligence, “COMINT is widely regarded as both the most prevalent and the most
valuable intelligence.” J. Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of
Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, n.220
(1998).
156
E.E.B. & K.E.M., supra note 148, at 825.
157
Id.
158
Id.
151
152
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fact that the entity that is the object of the operation will almost certainly
take countermeasures to block the flow of the targeted information.159
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become
brutally clear just how magnified both the accumulation of intelligence
about terrorist groups by means of communication intelligence has
become, and also the importance of preventing those groups from
becoming aware of the information-gathering techniques employed
against them. As the enemies of the United States increasingly become
groups that are not officially recognized nation-states, it is more difficult
to identify the targets of intelligence, and thus more problematic to learn,
among other things, of their military capabilities, possible future strikes,
styles of recruitment, and comforting abettors.160
Additionally,
intelligence is clearly an essential way to enable the United States and its
allies to find, pursue, and apprehend terrorists.161 Furthermore, in
contrast to the wars of previous generations, the war on terror has more
at stake, for a failure in our intelligence of the enemy could lead to a new
Pearl Harbor or September 11th calamity, but with the use of weapons of
mass destruction in the place of dive bombers or hijacked airliners.162
It would be naïve to think that when terrorist organizations learn of
the intelligence methods that the United States or its allies use, they

Id. The Supreme Court has tended to understand as much. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not
and ought not to be published to the world”) (quoting C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (“[t]he
Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information
important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the
effective operation of our foreign intelligence service”).
160
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror, National Security Council Press Release,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionII.html#challenges (last visited Feb.
13, 2008) (describing as one of the challenges of the War on Terror that “[t]errorist networks
today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells
inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure[.]”
Additionally, terrorists’ “[i]ncreasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has
enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and
spread their propaganda without risking personal contact”).
161
Schoenfeld, supra note 106, at 4; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 139
(2006) (explaining the high value of indirect intelligence in the fight against terrorism,
hypothecizing examples of “an imam who, though not himself involved in terrorism, was
preaching holy war . . .family members of a terrorist, who might have information about
his whereabouts . . . sales invoices for materials that could be used to create weapons of
mass destruction, or of books and articles that expressed admiration for suicide bombers”).
162
Schoenfeld, supra note 106, at 4. Also, the fact that our society is so open leaves us
“uniquely vulnerable.” Id.
159
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would not take countermeasures, just as a traditional nation would do.163
In fact, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda rely on information from
media sources to a substantial extent.164 An al Qaeda training manual,
along with details about how to make bombs, take hostages, assassinate
leaders, and withstand interrogation, also instructs how to obtain critical
information about the societies that its members target:
Using . . . public source[s] openly and without resorting
to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80% of
information about the enemy. The percentage varies
depending on the government’s policy on freedom of
the press and publication. It is possible to gather
information through newspapers, magazines, books,
periodicals,
official
publications,
and
enemy
broadcasts.165
The NSA program and the TFTP operation were two of the most
important tools that the United States government used to gain crucial
intelligence about al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.166 Utilized
when international communications were discovered between a
suspected terrorist and a person inside America, the information
gathered was surely numerous and invaluable; Risen and Lichtblau’s
December 2005 article even pointed out that information collected by the
program was used to apprehend terrorist Iyman Faris.167 Similarly, the
TFTP was especially helpful in curtailing the flow of funds to terrorist
organizations.168 Through the program, the government was able to
Rick Brundrett, Gonzales Talks Tough Against Terrorists, THE STATE, Jan. 12, 2007
(reporting that Attorney General Gonzales told his audience of U.S. Attorneys that “more
needs to be done because terrorists ‘change tactics in response to what we do’”).
164
Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 233, 234 (2005) (discussing the impact that the combination of the nature of technology
and the freedom of expression in America and Great Britain is having on the ability of
terrorists to obtain and disseminate critical information).
165
Id. at 234-35 (quoting an al Qaeda training manual salvaged from a safe house in
Manchester, England). The manual goes on to assert that much other information can be
gained from ordinary media, such as photographs of government personnel, information
concerning economic vulnerabilities, access to secure buildings, location of water sources,
observations of response times, and even prophylactic measures utilized by first
responders. Id. at 235.
166
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the NSA
program); see also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (asserting the necessity for the
TFTP program).
167
See supra note 105 (explaining the terrorist plot of Faris).
168
Levey, supra note 115, at 1. “‘[F]ollowing the money’ is one of the most valuable
sources of information that we have to identify and locate the networks of terrorists and
their supporters.” Id.
163
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deter future donors by blocking the operations of a bogus charity or
company, and also by arresting donors.169 Additionally, the government
followed the money trail to identify terrorist networks and their
supporters and operatives.170 Again, the details of successes stemming
from the program remain top secret, but both Secretary Snow and
Secretary Levey have each publicly hailed the program as, at least when
functioning covertly, a highly effective tool.171
However, New York Times executive editor Bill Keller defended the
publication of both articles.172 Generally, he has asserted the obvious, yet
powerful, point that the freedom of the press is central to the First
Amendment and that the media holds a unique role as watchdog over
government activities.173 More specifically, Keller has maintained that
the terrorists, before the disclosure, could not have been so naïve as to
believe that their international communications were not being traced.174
He utilized this same argument regarding the decision to disclose the

Id.
Id.
171
Snow, supra note 122, at A24 (calling the program “a robust and classified effort to
map terrorist networks . . . [I] sought to impress upon him [Mr. Keller] the great value the
program had in defeating terrorism”). See also Levey, supra note 115, at 3-4:
I have received the written output from this program as part of my
daily intelligence briefing. For two years, I have been reviewing that
output every morning. I cannot remember a day when that briefing
did not include at least one terrorism lead from this program. Despite
attempts at secrecy, terrorist facilitators have continued to use the
international banking system to send money to one another, even after
September 11th. This disclosure compromised one of our most
valuable programs and will only make our efforts to track terrorist
financing—and to prevent terrorist attacks – harder. Tracking terrorist
money trails is difficult enough without having our sources and
methods reported on the front page of newspapers.
Id. at 3-4.
172
See, e.g., Bill Keller, Letter from Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records Report, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2006; Transcript, The Situation Room, Interview With Bill Keller; Bomb Threat
Forces Closure of Major American Port, CNN.COM, June 26, 2006, http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0606/26/sitroom.03.html (last visited Feb 14, 2008).
173
See generally Keller, supra note 172.
174
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 31. However, there are examples where terrorists have
continued to be seemingly naive. As previously mentioned, the NSA program has
produced results since September 11th, including the discovery ofinternational
communications between terror suspects and Iyman Faris. See supra note 105. It also
uncovered another al Qaeda plan to bomb British pubs and train stations in 2004 partly
from information obtained via the NSA program. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at
A1. These examples were even included in the story the Times’ published, thus it seems
erroneous for the executive editor to later claim that the terrorists must be too intelligent to
communicate via international communications. Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 31.
169
170
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TFTP program.175 However, regardless of the strength of the policy
arguments offered by each viewpoint, pertinent statutes and case law
must be examined to determine whether the New York Times can be
prosecuted for their disclosure of the classified programs.176
C. The Possibilities of Prosecution
Relatively recent case law over the past several decades has
suggested that a prosecution under a statute such as this would not be
unfathomable.177 At least four Justices asserted in the Pentagon Papers
case that prosecutions against reporters and publishers could be
permitted.178 However, when such was attempted against reporters
Ellsberg and Russo, it was not judged on its merits.179 Furthermore, in
United States v. Morison,180 the court found that even the ambiguous
Espionage Act could be applied to a media-related situation, as opposed
to the classic case of turning over classified information to an agent of a
foreign government.181 Further indicating that the courts are willing to
protect national security secrets, AIPAC officials are currently being
prosecuted for obtaining classified information and conspiring to pass it
along to other diplomats and the media.182 Again, the conduct of
persons who are involved in their professional activity as lobbyists and
who are not government employees who pass protected information to
others, is, in certain respects, very similar to the conduct of the New York
Times.183
Among the provisions of the Espionage Act that may allow a
prosecution, the logical place to begin is section 793(e), which prohibits
one who has “unauthorized possession of . . . information relating to the
national defense” which could be “used to the injury of the United
See generally Keller, supra note 172.
See infra Part III.C.
177
See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
178
See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
179
See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing the events surrounding the
attempted prosecution of Ellsberg and Russo); see also United States v. Russo, No. 9373(WMB)-CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973).
180
844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
181
See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Morison case and its
implications on the application of the Espionage Act).
182
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also supra notes 85-97
and accompanying text (explaining the AIPAC case and its repercussions on national
security situations).
183
See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (examining the similarities between
Rosen and Weissman and the disclosures of the New York Times).
175
176
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States” from “willfully communicat[ing] . . . the same to any person not
entitled to receive it . . . .”184 Although many of the terms used in the
statute are inherently vague, if the statute is given a broad
understanding, the disclosures by the New York Times seem to fit under
the plain meaning of the statute.185 Because both programs were illegally
leaked to Risen and Lichtblau, their possession was unauthorized, and
they willfully communicated details of the classified information when
the stories were published.186 Finally, terrorists who read the articles are
not persons entitled to receive the information, thus its disclosure could
have caused injury to the United States, and the publication of the stories
on the front page of a major national newspaper was a communication of
the information.
Bluntly stated, however, section 793(e) has never been applied as the
plain meaning suggests that it could be.187 The legislative history of the
Espionage Act as a whole gives the most compelling reasons for this.188
In 1917, Congress explicitly refused to enact a provision that would have
prohibited publications of national defense information, and after a
heated debate, instead ratified the ambiguous language that largely
survived until today.189 When amended in 1950, Congress then passed
the narrow COMINT statute, again inferentially refusing to enact a broad
press censorship provision.190 As a result, it should be concluded that
the Espionage Act could not be utilized to successfully prosecute Risen,
Lichtblau, Keller, or the publisher of the New York Times.
The analysis, of course, cannot stop there, for the applicability of the
COMINT statute is another possibility for prosecution. After examining
the plain meaning of the words in the statute that applies to, “[w]hoever
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000); see supra note 29 for entire text of the statute.
See supra Part III.A (discussing the ambiguous nature of the provision).
186
However, the criminal element “willfully” has been called “chameleon-like,” where
its meaning seems to change depending on the context of its application. See Sharon L.
Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE
L.J. 341, 380 n.155 (1998).
187
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1032. “On their face, however, the purposes of
subsections 793(d) and (e) are mysterious because the statutes are so sweeping as to be
absurd.” Id.
188
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
Espionage Act).
189
Id.
190
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. “Doubts that the legislative history
justifies the conclusion that Congress saw a general distinction between communication
and publication are reinforced because the distinction is not theoretically sound in the
context of the espionage statutes and cannot be applied in any sensible fashion.” Edgar &
Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1035.
184
185
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knowingly and willfully . . . publishes . . . any classified information . . .
concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United
States. . .,” prosecution is a very viable option for the disclosure of the
NSA program.191 The disclosure was knowing and willful and was
accomplished by means of publishing on the front page of a national
newspaper.192 Moreover, the New York Times knew the program was a
highly classified governmental secret that had been leaked to it.193
Finally, the element that requires that the subject of the disclosure
concern communications intelligence also is met, as the NSA program
seems to be exactly what Congress had in mind when it included the
term “communications intelligence” in the definition section of the
statute.194
Furthermore, the legislative history of the COMINT statute is
particularly helpful in this situation.195 The Chicago Tribune incident
during World War II is eerily similar to the disclosure of the NSA
program, as each of them instructed the United States’ deadly enemies of
the methods by which America was gathering information about them,
and they both occurred during armed conflicts.196 When the COMINT
statute was enacted in 1950, it was in direct response to the Tribune
incident, and it logically follows that Congress thought that the narrow
category of press censorship mandated by the provision was necessary
to maintain national security, into which the NSA program plainly fits.197
However, it does not seem that the disclosure of the TFTP program
could be applied in a similar fashion. Just as the Espionage Act is vague
as applied to the NSA disclosure, it is also ambiguous in terms of the
TFTP operation.198 Under the Espionage Act, the subject matter of the
communication is not the crucial element, but rather the means by which

18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2000); see supra note 37 for the full text of the statute.
See generally supra Part II.E.
193
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1. “Nearly a dozen current and former officials,
who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program . . . .” Id.
194
18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (2000). “The term ‘communication intelligence’ means all
procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of
information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.” Id.; see also
supra note 37 (for the full text of the statute).
195
See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of the
COMINT statute).
196
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (explaining the historical setting in which
the COMINT statute was passed).
197
Id.
198
See supra Part III.A (discussing the vagueness of the Espionage Act).
191
192
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the communication occurred, and Congress did not intend for
publishing to be criminalized.199
Additionally, the COMINT statute cannot be applied to the
publishing of the TFTP operation either. While the statute does prohibit
publishing, nowhere in the COMINT statute does the provision mandate
the prosecution for the disclosure of the subject matter of financial
intelligence.200 In 1950, Congress made a conscious choice by limiting
the censorship of the press to the narrow field of communications
intelligence and code systems.201 It can thus be inferred that Congress
did not believe the rights of the press should be curtailed to limit the
publishing of other classified information, including economic tracking
and monitoring systems.202
The Espionage Act was amended in 1950 after the Chicago Tribune
incident shook the nation and Congress’ collective conscience, as
Congress had determined that the media utilized excessive discretion in
its decision to publish the secret of the breaking of the Japanese code.203
Over half a century later, it is possible that history similarly taught
Congress that the time has come to update the Federal Criminal Code to
prohibit journalists from publishing other categories of classified
intelligence information.
IV. CONTRIBUTION—A NECESSARY UPDATE
Current federal statutes that allow criminal charges to be brought
against those who publish certain types of confidential national security
intelligence information are insufficient in today’s post-September 11th
world.204 Specifically, while the COMINT statute can be applied to
publishers of communications intelligence such as the disclosure of the
NSA warrantless wiretap program, neither it nor the Espionage Act
includes provisions that allow for prosecution of persons or entities that
publish other confidential intelligence information.205

199
See supra note 135 (describing the uncertainty as to whether the prohibitive scope of
the Espionage Act reaches publication).
200
18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000); see supra note 37 (for the full text of the statute).
201
Id.
202
See supra note 144 (explaining the narrow focus of the COMINT statute).
203
See supra notes 39-44 (discussing the direct relationship between the Chicago Tribune
article and the COMINT statute).
204
See supra Part III.
205
See supra Part III.C.
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Therefore, this Note proposes an additional statute to the Federal
Criminal Code that prohibits the publishing of classified government
programs that deal with the tracking and following of suspected
terrorists’ financial activities.206 The statute, which could be located in
the Code after the related provisions at 18 U.S.C. § 800, is based largely
from the COMINT statute, as its wording is unambiguous and narrow.207
With the twin goals of plugging a current breach in national security
laws, while still protecting the freedom of the press, the following statute
is proposed:
A. Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 800208
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates,
furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an
unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the
detriment of the United States any classified information
concerning the financial intelligence activities of the United
States or any foreign government shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section –
The
term
“classified
information”
means
information which, at the time of a violation of this
section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically
designated by a United States Government Agency for
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;
The term “foreign government” includes in its
meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to
act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department,
agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign
country, or for or on behalf of any government or any
person or persons purporting to act as a government

See infra note 208.
See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (discussing the focused language and
scope of the COMINT statute).
208
With the exception of the italicized language, the language of the proposed statute has
been reproduced from the statutory language of the COMINT statute and its
corresponding definitions.
206
207
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within a foreign country, whether or not such
government is recognized by the United States;
The term “financial intelligence activities” means all
procedures and methods used in the monitoring of information
related to financial data obtained from international financial
institutions;
The term “unauthorized person” means any person
who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive
information of the categories set forth in subsection (a)
of this section, by the President, or by the head of a
department or agency of the United States Government
which is expressly designated by the President to engage
in financial intelligence activities for the United States.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the
furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any
regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House
of Representatives of the United States, or joint
committee thereof.
(d) Any person convicted of a violation of this
section shall forfeit, to the United States irrespective of
any provision of State law –
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as
the result of such violation; and
(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate
the commission of, such violation.
B. Commentary
The goal of proposed section 800 is to allow the prosecution of
persons, including journalists and publishers, who disclose confidential
programs or methods utilized by the government to monitor the
transfers of funds that often occur in correspondence with terrorist
activities. As a shadowy enemy without an official nation, it is quite
difficult to employ traditional methods to successfully discover the
actions and future plans of terrorist organizations and individuals.
Often, the best way to gain intelligence about terrorists is to observe the
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residual effects of their actions, which include their manners of
communications and means of funding their operations. The COMINT
statute prohibits the disclosure of classified programs that gain
communications intelligence, and proposed section 800 will ban the
disclosure, including the publishing, of manners of tracing financial
activities.
In addition, proposed section 800 will not unconstitutionally abridge
the freedom of the press. As at least four justices mentioned in the
Pentagon Papers case, the Espionage Act, even with all of its
troublesome statutory language, could in theory be applied to criminally
prosecute journalists who disseminate certain government secrets.209
Thus, because the language of proposed section 800 is unambiguous,
includes definitions for potentially unclear terms, and is much more
focused than the Espionage Act, the provision will pass a constitutional
challenge on vagueness or overbreadth grounds and the judiciary also
should have no hesitation in applying it. Furthermore, both Morison and
the recent AIPAC case indicate that courts will faithfully apply enacted
statutes, especially when national security interests are at stake.210
Moreover, similar to the COMINT statute, section 800 is an
extremely targeted provision that seeks not to silence the press, but
instead to protect vital anti-terrorist interests.211 Just as when Congress
passed the COMINT statute to target disclosures similar to the Chicago
Tribune’s publishing of cryptographic information in World War II,
Congress would clearly intend section 800 to apply only to disclosures
similar to the TFTP revelation, as the legislative history and
Congressional debate would undoubtedly indicate.212 As a result, there
would be no fear that section 800 would suppress the media from
making any comments on national defense information, as the broad and
defeated provision offered by the Wilson administration to Congress in
1917 would have done.213 Such would be neither the intent nor the result
of the proposed legislation.
The tracking and combating of terrorist finances is a critical tool in
the war on terror, and proposed section 800 would arm the government
with a weapon that could allow it to fight the war without unnecessary
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.
211
See supra Part III.A.
212
See supra Part II.B.
213
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (examining the defeat of the Wilson
administration’s press censorship proposal).
209
210
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interference from journalists. After all, “[t]racking terrorist money trails
is difficult enough without having our sources and methods reported on
the front page of newspapers.”214
In total, proposed section 800 serves two important purposes. First,
it fills a void in the Criminal Code by prohibiting the disclosure,
particularly the publishing, of classified information regarding a crucial
weapon in the war on terror, the tracking of terrorist finances. As the
war on terror is an unconventional war, it follows that unconventional
methods must be utilized to give America its best opportunity for
victory, and monitoring the money trail of terrorists is a critical weapon.
Certainly, our enemies should not be able to learn of our classified
methods of fighting terror by simply subscribing to the New York Times.
Second, proposed section 800’s plain language and clear legislative
history would unambiguously indicate that the freedom of the press is
not unnecessarily abridged, as only a narrow, yet important, subject
matter is prohibited from disclosure. In sum, section 800 would impede
American journalists from distributing this nation’s anti-terror secrets,
while at the same time not unnecessarily abridging the freedom of the
press.
V. CONCLUSION
As wars and conflicts evolve, so must the laws of the United States
progress to ensure the survival and safety of its citizens. Congress has
done this in the past, as its enacted statutes regarding the disclosure of
classified information have developed to guard against certain
transgressions.
The statute that is proposed in this Note is a
continuation of that development. Instead of attempting a strained and
misguided application of the Espionage Act, proposed section 800 would
prohibit journalists from giving away narrow yet crucial secrets that
have been illegally leaked to them through backchannels. By passing
such legislation, our newspapers at home, disenchanted leakers in the
government, and our enemies abroad would realize that the United
States government will not tolerate the disclosure of its secrets, whether
traded in the dead of the night by spies or publicized in its newspapers.
In a world where everyday is September 12, Congress should not wait
for the occurrence of the nightmare scenario presented in Part I before it
gets serious about fighting terrorism. This Note’s proposed statute
would be one small, yet necessary, step in the right direction towards

214
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ensuring that the situation recounted in Part I remains only a
hypothetical.
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